The total Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) wounded figures are in the neighborhood of 50K injured as reported by OSD sites to I think in late 2007. That number does not include the number of folks who will have after effects from repeated combat tours which will appear once they rotate home. As to being an enormous number of injuries, depends on what your frame of reference is. I have none outside of a desire to see anyone who was injured in the service of this country receive the best of care this nation can deliver.

My hope is that General Shinseki takes it as his personal mission to see that a standard of one wounded warrior not being treated properly is one too many, no matter what era a service member served in.

1.Tube artillery would have been VERY useful if you had put just 1 Crusader there. And, it could have been done.

As it was, the COMBATANT COMMANDER REQUESTED MULTIPLE PALADIN ARTILLERY for Afghanistan, and Rumsfeld DENIED it. It sounds amzingly similar to what ASPIN did in Somolia re: tanks.

2. Who would this rate of fire be used against? Ummm… think about it…. The rate of fire is an enabler. Whereas Paladin is a 50 year old design set system that allows about 1 shot per minute, Crusader allows about 10 per minute. When you are not shooting on the move and you set artillery in, you need at least 8 Paladin to replace one Crusader. The rate of fire allows for an across the force reduction in tube artillery, while INCREASING ability to deliver rounds.

3.In answer to how “A lot of the Army believes the preponderance of artillery is a legacy of the Cold War.”, one need only look at the NUMBER of UNFULFILLED FIRES REQUESTED on the push in Iraq.

Have you looked at that?

4. You are asking why, ” And this was bad because??” in reference to Rumsfeld DENYING the COMBATANT COMMANDER access to the requisite artillery per doctrine? I don’t even know how to answer this question if you don’t get my point. That decision resulted in casualties, and countless UNFULFILLED FIRES requested. See my original point.

5. Crusader WAS transformative. Rate of fire alone would have been the biggest resucer of weight across the Army Ground Vehicles. It was a hell of a lot better than NLOS-C (which Rumsfeld promised to start fielding by FY06 and is STILL in development). NLOS-C is now a smaller tube and requires Excalibur to hit the 36km KPP. LESS PUNCH, LESS LETHALITY.

And NOW we will wait until 2013-2015 BEFORE we see any NLOS-C fields.

That, of course, IF it is fielded, which is unlikely because it is attached developmentally to the FCS Common Chassis, which will likely be killed by Obama.

As a result, our infantrymen will likely be reliant in 10-20 years relying on a 70-80 year old system in the Paladin as fed through the PIM.

6. And when people bring up the issue of air transportability of Crusader, let me point out a couple of things. We aren’t transporting PALADIN or other ground vehicles by air. Show me on engagement where we have ever even transported a BN by air.

Furthermore, the original requirement was for C-130 transportability as established by G-3. Using every technological means possible, even NLOS C is not transportable this way, although it was forcibly form fit. If it was ever transported, which it won’t be, get ready for C17.

Future hard assets will almost certainly be transported by ship, as they have always been. But, we’ve destroyde our ship acquisition too. Get ready… we’re spiraling down just like the British.

One of the larger debates in the Army is about how we can get the politicians to realize that we can no longer sustain our commitments and need to prepare to be more of a regional power.

Either that, or SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE our acquisition budget. $40-60 Billion a year would be a start.

according to John at This Ain’t Hell, Shinseki was a tanker who went on a pout because, at the time he was wearing a black beret, as tankers did at the time, he had to give it up, because the black beret belonged to the Rangers. So, he got his revenge when he became ACS and ordered the black beret for everyone, bought it from the Chicoms, and gave the Rangers the tan beret.

We are using artillery, primarily Paladin and 155 shells in both Iraq and Afghanistan today. Occasionally we use the Excalibur round, but more often it is simple 155 HEDP that we have scoped and adjusted to the TRP’s.

We have literally fired thousands of rounds in the past few months.

Please explain to me how Afghanistan and Iraq are not 21st century warfare.

If you would like to see some results, perhaps this would give you a taste of how we are using it.

Transcript of DoD “Bloggers’s Roundtable” with Colonel Jon Lehr, Commander of the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division (23 May 2008) – Excerpt:

SHACTMAN: I remember spending some time with you last year and you talked about you believed in the power of artillery to really persuade the local population to not work with insurgents and to work with coalition forces. And so I wonder now, nine months later, if you still hold that view and if you guys are still using artillery to the extent you were last fall?

COL. LEHR: Well, that’s a great question and one I like talking about. Eleven thousand five hundred rounds, I still believe in the carrot and stick, based on the propensity of this culture to — how they deal with power and authority. And it goes back to — it serves a couple purposes, the whole terrain denial piece.

One, we deny terrain to insurgents, (movement ?) routes, IED placement, those types of things. But it also sends a significant message when we start concentrating on a particular area for four or five days at 75 to 100 rounds a day in a given area, it has a profound impact on the population. Just like if I would start shooting artillery around your neighborhood.

We always do the collateral damage assessments and we will not — we have mathematical formulas that we know the effect, the physical effect of the round going off on anything nearby. So that’s not an issue, but it’s just the psychological impact.

If I would start shooting artillery around your neighborhood, it would quickly get your attention and cause you to start asking questions. Why are they doing this? And most of the time, 99 percent of the time they know why we’re doing it. We just received a series of IEDs that damaged vehicles, hurt our soldiers, et cetera. So they quickly get the message.

And I’ve seen at least six separate times where it brought tribal leadership to the table, and they say, okay, we understand what you’re doing and we’re willing to help you. I think it’s just another tool in the kitbag, lethal, non-lethal kitbag. And you’ve heard the expression “carrot and stick,” and I believe — I’m convinced that it works pretty well in most situations in this culture.